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For several weeks during the autumn of 2005, riots raged in the streets of Paris. Every night, hundreds of cars were 
burned, shops were vandalized, and violence 
ruled. French President Jacques Chirac con-
cluded that his nation was suffering from a pro-
found “malaise,” a word that indeed captures 
the reality of economic and social problems in 
many European countries. After centuries of 
economic leadership, Europe must now face 
the truth that its governing institutions—espe-
cially its labor markets—are deeply flawed. 
Those who finally took to the streets, native 
and immigrant citizens alike, were severely 
affected by unemployment.
France may be the most stubborn defender 
of the so-called European social model, char-
acterized by vast government intervention in 
the economy, but many other governments in 
Western Europe are committed to the same phi-
losophy. Presidents and prime ministers devote 
speeches to nostalgic messages and promise to 
maintain and protect the existing social model. 
Their rhetoric translates into policies that are a 
new kind of protectionism for traditional jobs, 
a protectionism that is reflected in the wide-
spread official resistance to a single European 
Union (EU) market in services, disapprovals of 
business mergers, and an anxious debate about 
the “Polish plumber” representing free flows of 
labor within the EU.
We Europeans are clearly at a crossroads. 
Either we look to the future and learn from suc-
cessful market-oriented reforms, or we look 
back to the past and continue trying to shield 
old occupations from international economics. It 
is a choice between openness and protectionism, 
between modernization and nostalgia—indeed, 
between government intervention and freedom 
itself. The problems of Europe are not born over-
seas, but are innate to the process of internal eco-
nomic development and change. That is why a 
tighter adherence to a failing model will only 
exacerbate current problems and lead to more 
unrest in European cities. Rioting and decline is 
a destiny that no European wants to face.
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Yet there is reason for optimism. Never 
before have so many countries been so deeply 
involved in the global economy, and the benefits 
of globalization—economic growth, employ-
ment, and competition—are ever clearer. Never 
before have so many countries made success-
ful free-market reforms, which is an inspira-
tion for others. Almost all European countries 
can point to at least one successful reform, and 
as we copy each other’s successes, the future 
should rapidly become much brighter.
In my view, of all the areas that are still in 
need of substantial reform, the most impor-
tant is the labor market. People—especially the 
young—want jobs and freedom, not depen-
dence on government.
THE LABOR MARKET AND OTHER 
MARKETS: A FUNDAMENTAL 
DIFFERENCE?
Critics have difficulty seeing labor as a mar-
ket like other markets. In the public debate, it 
is often assumed that there is a fundamental 
difference between the labor market and other 
markets. “Bananas can be traded freely in the 
market,” the argument goes, “but people are 
not bananas. In the labor market, we need gov-
ernment intervention.” Even assuming there is 
a difference, however, one might ask: Should 
bananas have more freedom than workers? Is 
the market for labor truly unique in the way 
that critics suggest?
My answer is no. The free market is a superi-
or institution for labor, yielding the best results 
for society and workers, just as the free mar-
ket has proven superior for virtually all other 
fields. Furthermore, government interven-
tion produces the same problems in the labor 
market that it produces in any other market. 
Finally, in a globalized world, a free labor mar-
ket is increasingly important as a way to make 
workers more competitive and, ultimately, bet-
ter compensated.
The addition of the new labor freedom fac-
tor to the 2007 Index of Economic Freedom is thus 
highly relevant. The elements that comprise 
this new category encompass several common 
restrictions on freedom that produce conse-
quences for the labor market. Freedom is just 
as essential in the labor market as it is in any 
other market; indeed, it is fundamental to the 
concept of economic freedom.
MARKET PRINCIPLES 
AND DEREGULATION
The core principle of a market is free, vol-
untary exchange. That principle has several 
components: free choice, free pricing, and free 
competition. Today, in scholarly research or 
policy debates, it is generally accepted that the 
free market leads to constant improvements. 
A thousand consumer goods compared over 
time reveal the relentless impact of competitive 
pressure for innovation, price reduction, and 
consumer prosperity. Consider the DVD disc 
technology now sweeping away the VHS tape, 
which itself was an innovation two decades 
ago.
A more profound lesson is that whole soci-
eties are similarly superior to others, at least in 
purely economic terms. A comparison between 
the free economies in Europe versus the central-
ly planned economies reveals much. A BMW is 
better than a Trabant, the poorly manufactured, 
expensive, and polluting cars made in the for-
mer East Germany.
Innovators and entrepreneurs compete to 
satisfy consumers. Free exchange is good in 
a town, better in a country, and best in every 
country: more minds, more ideas, more peo-
ple that want to create something new. The 
globalized economy has enlarged markets and 
increased specialization. Competition means 
lower consumer prices, a broader supply, and 
better quality. Improvements in everyday life 
on a global scale constantly confirm the text-
book theories.
The free market unleashes creativity and 
change. It has been estimated that three-quar-
ters of all products today did not exist in any 
form 100 years ago.1 Joseph Schumpeter ’s 
point about destruction of the old being a nec-
1  William D. Nordhaus, “Do Real-Output 
and Real-Wage Measures Capture Reality? The 
History of Lighting Suggests Not,” in Timothy 
F. Bresnahan and Robert J. Gordon, eds., The 
Economics of New Goods (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997).
essary condition for creation of the new is both 
relevant and visible in society.2 Some 150 years 
ago in Western Europe, three-quarters of the 
population was employed in agriculture ver-
sus about 3 percent today, and today’s farmers 
produce more total output. Innovation in eco-
nomic efficiency is therefore interwoven with 
the changing composition of the labor force.
LABOR MARKET INTERVENTION 
IN THEORY
As the types of work and jobs changed dur-
ing the Industrial Revolution, governments 
required better general treatment of workers. A 
minimum wage became common, as did other 
regulations mandating that businesses limit the 
number of hours each worker could contribute 
per week. As prosperity advanced, so did the 
multitude and variety of labor regulations.
Government interventions in the labor mar-
ket are not limited to wages or hours; they also 
affect hiring and firing practices, workplace 
rules, safety, and even the kind of language 
allowed. In various ways, the interventions 
also decide how, with what, where, and when 
people work. Government also affects pricing 
through taxation and trade union privileges, 
notably collective bargaining. Finally, govern-
ments often mandate social insurance systems, 
such as pensions. Unlike many other govern-
ment programs, regulatory structures normal-
ly impose costs that are invisible to the public 
simply because they do not show up on gov-
ernment budgets.
Why do governments intervene in labor 
markets? Three possible explanations are com-
monly cited: (a) to make the labor market more 
efficient, implying greater per capita incomes; 
(b) to gain political power; or (c) as a natural 
consequence of different legal systems. A 2004 
Harvard study of 85 countries empirically 
tested the three theories and found no sup-
port for the efficiency theory. On the contrary, 
the researchers showed that heavy regulations 
in the labor market produced adverse conse-
quences for employment. But they did find 
2  Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (New York: Harper, 1975).
significant support for the other explanations: 
a clear connection between higher regulation 
and leftist governments and substantial evi-
dence that legal origin countries have more 
labor market regulations than common law 
countries.3
Countries with more left-leaning govern-
ments tend to enact stricter labor regulations, 
which yield adverse efficiency results. The 
main reason behind most of the interventions, 
however, is a perception of reality: the fear of 
a “race to the bottom.” In other words, pre-
venting “social dumping” motivates interven-
tion. Skeptics have long warned that wages 
and other working conditions will decline in a 
pure free market. This skepticism has roots in 
the Marxist notion of capitalism, which retains 
its appeal even though economic history has 
hardly been kind to the theory in practice.
In Western Europe, on average, wages are 
roughly 10 times higher today than they were 
a hundred years ago because our productiv-
ity today is that much higher. We produce, per 
person, 10 times more value, which is why we 
get more pay. If we had not increased produc-
tivity, no regulations or trade unions in the 
world could have created such tenfold wage 
increases. Moreover, if wages in a free market 
are set below productivity, a competitor will 
benefit from offering the employees a higher 
wage. Thus, “social dumping” is largely a 
myth. Those who argue that labor protections 
are essential for a higher quality of life should 
ponder this point, as well as the material mis-
ery of countries that embrace such policies.
Why else would the world’s highest wages be 
found in the United States, where the labor mar-
ket is relatively free and only some 10 percent 
of the labor force are members of trade unions?4 
Why else would multinational companies vol-
untarily pay workers in, for example, China 30 
percent higher wages on average than old, state-
owned, industries do? And why did the average 
3  Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La 
Porta, Florencio Lopez De Silanes, and Andrei 
Schleifer, “The Regulation of Labor,” The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, November 2004.
4  See International Labor Organization Web site 
at http://laborsta.ilo.org/.
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wages rise by three times in foreign-owned com-
panies during the past 10 years?5 The desire to 
make a profit in a free market benefits not only 
consumers, but also workers.
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels pointed out 
that capitalism—in 1848—had created more 
wealth than had been experienced by all pre-
vious human generations combined,6 but they 
thought that an elite group of capitalists would 
eventually capture all the wealth and leave 
workers poor. They were proven totally wrong. 
The global explosion of living standards—for 
all people, not just the rich—since that time is 
breathtaking, and it has happened to the larg-
est extent in countries that followed Marx’s and 
Engels’ recommendations the least.
RESULTS OF FREE MARKETS VS. 
INTERVENTION
Massive state interventions in the labor 
market are thus founded on a romantically 
appealing but scientifically void theory of how 
the market works. In practice, the distortions 
generated by limiting labor freedom follow 
suit. Europe happens to be a very telling show-
case for both regulation and deregulation in the 
labor market.
In Western Europe, the labor market is often 
highly regulated. The share of the working-age 
population employed in EU countries is only 
64 percent,7 and this really says little. “Work-
ing age” between the ages of 15 and 64 really 
should be redefined because people live very 
long and healthy lives today, compared to 
when the definition was established decades 
ago. The U.S., of course, is far from a free-mar-
ket heaven, but its labor market is freer than 
those found in most of Western Europe, and the 
U.S. employment rate is 72 percent.
5  Nicholas Lardy, “Do China’s Abusive Labor 
Practices Encourage Outsourcing and Drive Down 
American Wages?” testimony before the Senate 
Democratic Policy Committee, March 29, 2004.
6  Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The 
Communist Manifesto, 1848.





Consider that between 1970 and 2003, 
employment in the U.S. increased by 75 per-
cent. In France, Germany, and Italy, it increased 
by 26 percent.8 In 2004, only 13 percent of 
unemployed workers in the U.S. were unable 
to find a new job within 12 months; in the EU, 
the figure was 44 percent.9 In the EU, average 
youth unemployment is 17 percent. In the U.S., 
it is 10 percent.10
But the best comparisons can be made with-
in Europe itself. Denmark has an employment 
rate of 76 percent, but Poland is far lower at 
53 percent. Youth unemployment is above 20 
percent in Greece, Italy, Sweden, France, Bel-
gium, and Finland and below 8 percent in Ire-
land, the Netherlands, and Denmark.11 In the 
EU’s 15 member states, between 1995 and 2004, 
the development of employment was also very 
different between the countries. In Ireland, 
the Netherlands, and Spain, the increase in 
employment was the highest; in Germany and 
Austria, it was almost zero.12
What were the differences between the suc-
cessful countries and the others? First of all, 
the labor market was substantially freer in the 
countries that succeeded in creating new jobs.13 
Second, payroll and income taxes were more 
than 10 percentage points lower in the five best 
economies (in terms of job creation) compared 
to the five worst.14 Third, the levels of contri-
8  Olaf Gersemann, Cowboy Capitalism: European 
Myths, American Reality (Washington, D.C.: Cato 
Institute, 2004).
9  Diana Furchtgott-Roth, “What US Labor Laws 
Can Teach Europe,” Financial Times, August 11, 
2005.







12  European Commission, Employment in Europe 
2005, at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/
employment_analysis/employ_2005_en.htm.
13  Marc A. Miles, Edwin J. Feulner, and Mary 
Anastasia O’Grady, 2005 Index of Economic Freedom 
(Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation and 
Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2005).
14  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Taxing Wages 2004–2005, at http://
bution from the state for unemployment and 
sick leave were lower in the best economies.15 
What the successful countries have in common 
are freer labor markets, lower taxes, and lower 
contributions.
A look at the results for various countries 
in the labor freedom category in the Index pro-
vides further proof of the connection between 
labor freedom and employment. Table 1 shows 
all of the nations of Europe, including their EU 
affiliations, ranked according to their labor 
freedom scores in the 2007 Index.
Countries like Georgia, the U.K., Switzer-
land, and Denmark enjoy higher scores in labor 
freedom and have experienced better employ-
ment outcomes generally. Countries with low 
scores like Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Swe-
den have suffered weak employment and out-
right stagnation.
Comparing the 15 countries that were mem-
bers of the EU in 1995–2004 to EU-25 and non-
EU countries is illustrative. In Britain, the labor 
market is relatively free and earns a score of 82.7 
percent, whereas in Sweden, it is highly regulat-
ed and earns a score of 52 percent, compared to 
the EU-15 average of 59.7 percent. The 10 coun-
tries that recently joined the EU have raised their 
average labor freedom by nearly a full point, but 
the scores of non-EU economies average nearly 
five full percentage points higher. Yet the aver-
age income between 1995 and 2004 grew by 29 
percent in Sweden, 37 percent in EU-15 coun-
tries, and 72 percent in Britain. The income of 
the poorest 10 percent of the population grew 
by only 10 percent in Sweden, compared to 59 
percent in Britain.16 The worst off were better off 
where the labor market was freer.
The larger lesson is that Europe’s more 
“advanced” economies have generally cre-
ated more complex restrictions on labor free-
dom in the name of protecting workers. This 
www.oecd.org/document/40/0,2340,en_2649_37427_
36330280_1_1_1_37427,00.html.
15  European Commission, MISSOC (Mutual 
Information System on Social Protection in the 
European Union), 2004.
16  Euromonitor, “World Income Distribution 
2006/2007,” at www.euromonitor.com/World_Income_
Distribution.





EU-15 United Kingdom 82.7 
Armenia 80.9 
Switzerland 78.4 
EU-25 Czech Republic 77.2 
EU-15 Denmark 74.7 
Bulgaria 71.5 
EU-15 Belgium 70.5 
EU-15 Luxembourg 70.0 












EU-25 Lithuania 60.1 
EU-25 Malta 60.0 
EU-15 Netherlands 59.2 
Macedonia 58.1 
EU-15 Italy 57.6 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 57.3 
EU-25 Poland 56.2 
EU-15 Germany 54.6 
EU-15 Finland 53.4 
EU-15 Spain 52.7 
EU-15 Sweden 52.0 
Croatia 52.0 
Ukraine 51.8 
EU-25 Estonia 51.2 
Norway 51.1 
EU-25 Slovenia 48.7 
EU-15 Greece 48.5 
EU-15 Austria 46.8 







Source: Tim Kane, Kim R. Holmes, and Mary Anastasia O’Grady, 2007 
Index of Economic Freedom (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation 
and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2007), at www.heritage.org/index.
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relative wealth has been a convenient excuse 
for stagnant growth and higher unemploy-
ment, but the apology is losing its validity as 
many Eastern and Middle European countries 
experiment successfully with freedom.
WHY REGULATION CREATES 
PROBLEMS
The problems in the countries with substan-
tial state interventions in the labor market are 
no coincidence. Despite numerous differences 
between all countries, there are many common 
features. One common experience is a mis-
match between labor supply and demand when 
restrictions and protections are forced onto the 
market by government. A highly simplified 
image of a local labor market may help to shed 
some light on causes and consequences.
Imagine that your neighbor, having broken a 
leg, wants your son’s help to mow his lawn. He 
is prepared to pay 20 euros, and your son is will-
ing to do the work for as little as 15 euros. But 
imagine the state demanding a 50 percent tax. 
The deal (and work) are taxed out of existence. 
Or suppose the government demands that the 
service be performed by a public monopoly, 
which perhaps charges above 20 euros. Again, 
your son is without work. Or a labor market 
regulation demands a minimum wage of 50 
euros, and the neighbor is not willing to pay 
that much. Again, nothing happens. Or a trade 
union is allowed to deny your son access to your 
neighbor’s lawn because he is not a member of 
their organization. The result: no job.
Reality, of course, is more complicated, but 
this example describes in principle some of the 
most common barriers created by governments 
in the labor market. The state uses force to raise 
barriers against free exchange and thereby cre-
ates unemployment—all in the name of some 
“social” policy. It is not difficult to understand 
why such limitations in the name of protection 
generate widespread youth unemployment 
and resentment, resulting in such outcomes 
as the Paris riots. And there are several ticking 
bombs like Paris in Western Europe.
In recent years, the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
has published a number of studies that confirm 
these connections in its member countries.17 
Government interventions in the labor market 
produce serious negative effects in terms of 
unemployment, especially among young peo-
ple and immigrants. To some extent, this is also 
the intention. Trade unions are a cartel dedicat-
ed to limiting competition. Regulations against 
firing workers prevent old jobs from being 
replaced by new ones. It is common knowledge 
that allowing such interventions does produce 
adverse effects, but some people seem ready to 
accept those effects—for example, in order to 
win elections.
OBSTACLES TO FREE-MARKET 
REFORM
When the government of France proposed a 
limited deregulation of the labor market, there 
were massive protests. Young people dem-
onstrated under slogans like “Regulation!” 
despite a youth unemployment rate of 22 per-
cent. Fears of neoliberalism were frequently 
mentioned. Some interpreted this as a lack of 
understanding among the young French, but 
there is every reason to believe that many of 
them knew exactly what they were saying. 
Many of them were educated and might well 
have felt certain that they would belong to the 
privileged group that would have secure jobs 
in the future, even if others did not.
This well-known phenomenon has been 
referred to as “insiders and outsiders.” Those 
on the inside are well protected and care more 
about remaining so than they do about the 
vast numbers of people on the outside. They 
17  Giuseppe Nicoletti and Stefano Scarpetta, 
“Product Market Reforms and Employment in 
OECD Countries,” Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Economics Department 
Working Paper No. 472, December 21, 2005; Andrea 
Bassanini and Romain Duval, “Employment 
Patterns in OECD Countries; Reassessing the 
Role of Policies and Institutions,” Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Social, Employment and Migration Working Paper 
No. 35, June 2006; Boosting Jobs and Incomes—Policy 
Lessons from Reassessing the OECD Jobs Strategy, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, June 15–16, 2006, at www.oecd.
org/document/19/0,2340,en_21571361_36276310_
36276371_1_1_1_1,00.html.
do not want to give up their own “cradle to 
the grave” security so that others can have a 
job. But in a global economy characterized by 
rapid change and constant restructuring, even 
formerly secure jobs become insecure; and in 
a regulated labor market with few new jobs, it 
is hard to find a new one. Labor market regu-
lations thus tend to create a double insecurity, 
both for insiders and outsiders.
A broader issue is that labor problems are 
largely the result of these policies, not some-
thing evil created by invisible forces. High 
taxes on workers make hiring more expensive 
and working less profitable. Fewer can afford to 
hire, and the desire to work decreases. Combine 
that with the possibility of getting contributions 
from the state for unemployment or sick leave 
at 80 percent–90 percent of the previous salary, 
and the result is a so-called unemployment trap 
in which the economic benefit of going from 
government support to work is very limited. 
Those who are permanently on the outside, 
however, such as people in early retirement, get 
lower amounts. The government takes a lot of 
money from those who work to pay millions to 
those who do not work, and the result should 
not surprise anyone: fewer people working to 
support a growing number of people who are 
dependent on the government.
FORCE LEADS TO MORE FORCE
A central idea of those who favor interven-
tion in the labor market is that people should 
not work for low wages. Subsidies, minimum 
wages, and collective bargaining are said to 
avoid this. The ultimate effect, however, is 
that people with low productivity become 
unemployed. These groups, which have 
grown in size in Western Europe, are often 
labelled something like “early retired” rather 
than “unemployed,” but no matter what they 
are called, the effect is the same: They are not 
allowed to work for low wages, so they have 
to live their lives dependent instead on low 
contributions from the state. In many reform-
ing countries, such people are allowed to work 
and, unlike their counterparts in regulated 
countries, may rise in competence and salary 
over time.
There is a tendency in Western Europe to 
ignore the fact that this system is the cause of 
many problems, and thus to avoid gradually 
liberalizing it. Instead, regulation tends to cre-
ate more regulation, and government force 
leads to more force. It has become clear to most 
politicians that productive activities create 
wealth, but since the current system puts bar-
riers in the way, too little work is performed. 
Many politicians also understand that big 
public welfare monopolies and social security 
will be hard to finance in the future, so they 
talk with increasing frequency about people 
“having to work more.” Instead of deregulat-
ing and making work more profitable, which 
would boost people’s willingness to work, they 
keep the regulations and talk about duty and 
discipline. This is contrary to national survival, 
not just to economic freedom.
PROTECTIONISM OR FREE 
MARKETS?
In Western Europe, the two most common 
fears are of companies moving out and people 
moving in. In turn, this triggers various pro-
tectionist opinions and policies. In France, 
such policies have been labelled “economic 
patriotism,” which is in fact a continuing de 
facto endorsement of big government, more 
intrusive regulations, and more barriers to the 
world. To a large extent, the fears are exagger-
ated: Not many jobs have left, and immigra-
tion has been limited, though both are likely to 
increase. Mainly, these fears are founded on a 
misunderstanding of the market and the effects 
of regulation.
It might be regarded as a weakness of free 
economies that it is impossible to say exact-
ly which new goods, services, and jobs will 
replace the old. In a centrally planned economy, 
bureaucrats can pretend to know exactly how 
many people they will put in different factories 
next year. But the illusion of certainty is not a 
strength, and uncertainty is not necessarily a 
weakness. Innovation and the uncoordinated 
demand of free people are a solid foundation 
in fact. Nor does this mean the future is impos-
sible to know. We can see broadly what kinds 
of production have increased as traditional 
 Chapter 2 33
34 2007 Index of Economic Freedom
manufacturing employment has declined: in 
one word, services.
THE NEW JOBS
In recent decades, companies have rapidly 
been shedding manufacturing jobs throughout 
Western Europe. What emerges in their stead 
are service-sector occupations. About 70 per-
cent of the work force in Western Europe today 
is employed in the service sector. In Ireland, for 
example, employment in manufacturing has 
decreased by 10 percent since 2000, but total 
employment has risen by 10 percent. For every 
job lost, two new ones have been created; and 
as before, the new jobs are better, and wages 
are higher. We know now that the larger the 
share of services is in the economy, the higher 
the level of GDP per capita and the lower the 
level of unemployment.18
The single market for goods within the EU 
has created enormous prosperity and new 
jobs. A next logical step would be a single mar-
ket in services, but the European Parliament 
has approved only a watered-down services 
directive. Parliament removed sectors that 
would benefit the most from free trade in ser-
vices—health care and education—as well as 
the important and simplifying principle that 
allows countries to follow the regulations of 
their countries of origin. The gains could have 
been substantial indeed; studies have pointed 
to substantial gains in terms of increased eco-
nomic growth and employment. The watered-
down directive illustrates what happens when 
protectionism gains ground.
We have every reason to welcome the new. 
Logic dictates that the old must make way. If 
we lock up productive resources in the old 
sectors, the new economy cannot expand. 
This is always a painful process in the short 
run for those who are affected. What is a metal 
worker going to do when his job vanishes, 
whether it leaves the country or gets taken by 
a foreigner? We still do not have a society that 
makes gaining new competence and change 
18  World Bank, World Development Indicators 2005, 
at http://publications.worldbank.org/ecommerce/catalog/
product?item_id=631625.
profitable enough. The painful fact is that peo-
ple throughout Western Europe do not have 
enough new job opportunities. If their govern-
ments stopped focusing on how to protect old 
jobs, we could think more about how to facili-
tate change to the new.
The prime example of extreme protection-
ism is the European Agricultural Policy. It is 
a system of massive tax-paid subsidies, quo-
tas, tariffs, and regulations. What could have 
been a productive part of society, as agriculture 
became in New Zealand after deregulation, has 
instead become a burden. As industrial man-
ufacturing has evolved to utilize less labor, a 
terrible precedent has been established, and it 
haunts the policy debate. Manufacturing is, in 
that sense, the agriculture of our time.
GLOBALIZATION AND CHANGE
The global economy is a consequence of the 
fact that market theory has been spread to more 
parts of the world than ever before. Internation-
al trade and investment have increased sharply 
during the past 20 years. Barriers to trade and 
capital have been reduced. The global economy 
has been growing steadily.
The economic rise of China and India (with 
GDPs, respectively, that are 650 percent and 
350 percent higher today than they were in 
1980) has been analyzed extensively.19 So far, 
the number of Chinese that have entered the 
global work force has equaled the size of the 
U.S. work force, with 80 percent more Chinese 
on the way. Global poverty has been cut in half 
in 20 years, from 40 percent to 20 percent of 
the world’s population, using conservative 
estimates from the World Bank20 or distribu-
tional estimates from Xavier Sala-i-Martin.21 
GDP growth in poor countries that opened up 
19  Statistics from Central Statistical Organisation, 
India, International Monetary Fund, and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development.
20  Shaohua Chen and Martin Ravaillon, “How 
Have the World’s Poorest Fared Since the Early 
1980s?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 3341, 2004.
21  See, for example, Chapter 1, “Global 
Inequality Fades as the Global Economy Grows,” 
in this volume.
to the global economy averaged 5 percent dur-
ing the 1990s, whereas GDP in poor countries 
that were protectionist decreased by 1 percent 
a year.22
This has an obvious effect on Western labor 
markets. The emergence of developing coun-
tries creates new and wealthy markets for 
products from the U.S. and Europe. The fact 
that these countries gain competence and cre-
ate healthy business climates implies that they 
will be able to produce goods and services that 
they can make available to consumers in the 
U.S. and Europe. In turn, this enhances global 
specialization. Currently, quite a few manufac-
turing, information technology, and service jobs 
are moving to Southeast Asia. As the produc-
tivity of the people in these countries increases, 
even more high-skilled jobs are likely to depart. 
It is essential to recognize, however, that rising 
Asia is not stealing jobs, as in a zero sum game. 
Rather, the process of development is leading 
to gains in efficiency that result in less indus-
trial employment on net. Already, China has 
lost millions of manufacturing jobs.23
In a growing global economy, every coun-
try can become wealthier, but a country can-
not continue to produce the same goods and 
services when hundreds of millions of Chinese 
can do it for a fraction of the price. The same 
restructuring of the business sector and the 
labor market that has been going on for centu-
ries will accelerate, and a country that wants to 
be successful must have policies that facilitate 
that development as much as possible. Public 
monopolies, high taxes, labor market regula-
tions, and high public contributions to people 
who don’t work do the opposite.
DEMOGRAPHY AND CHANGE
The current problems in the labor market of 
Western Europe as a consequence of govern-
ment intervention may grow worse in a time 
of globalization. The other main trend, which 
22  Paul Collier and David Dollar, Globalization, 
Growth and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World 
Economy, World Bank, 2002.
23  John E. Hilsenrath and Rebecca Buckman, 
“Factory Employment Is Falling World-Wide,” The 
Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2003.
makes reform even more important, is the 
demographic situation. The average Europe-
an simply gets older. Fewer people are born, 
and we live longer. Some politicians seem to 
deplore this, because they oppose reform. Of 
course, the fact that we live longer and health-
ier lives on average is a sign of great progress, 
but it will nevertheless affect the labor market 
and government interventions, such as pen-
sions and health care.
In Germany, for example, it is estimated that 
the population will decrease from today’s 82 
million to 72 million in 2050. A similar trend 
is visible in many other European countries. If 
the same definition of “working age” is applied 
in the future, the population of working age in 
Germany will decrease from 56 million to 41 
million during the same period, and the popu-
lation of working age in Italy will decrease from 
39 million to 22 million. It might be said that it 
is hard to predict what the world will be like in 
45 years, but in fact everyone who will retire in 
2050 is already born. This has effects not only in 
terms of the number that work and how many 
they will have to support, but also in terms of 
growth. If the population decreases by 0.5 per-
cent a year and productivity rises by 0.5 per-
cent a year, growth is zero.24 Public expenditure 
would explode in several countries if nothing is 
done; in Spain, pension costs today amount to 
50 percent of public expenditure and would be 
80 percent by 2030 if nothing is done.25
Greater openness to immigration is often 
mentioned in this context, and of course it could 
increase the labor supply. But in time, immi-
grants also grow older. The real challenge is 
how older workers are treated and whether they 
have incentives to continue working if they are 
healthy in their later years. Today, when work-
ers retire later than the mandatory age, they lose 
benefits. The OECD has calculated the size of 
24  Gabriel Stein and Brian Reading, “Baby 
Boomer’s Poverty Trap: Continental/Japanese 
Ageing,” Monthly International Review, September 
2003.
25  Tito Boeri, “What Are the Options for Pension 
and Social Security Reforms in Europe?” paper 
presented at the 747th Wilton Park Conference, 
Germany, May 17–19, 2004.
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this loss, calling it a tax that amounts to between 
50 percent and 90 percent in various Western 
European countries. A free retirement age where 
the pension rises with the age of retirement does 
not punish people who want to work longer. In 
addition, the funding of health care and elderly 
care turns out to be a problem only if the govern-
ment continues to demand that those services be 
tax-funded. To the extent that such programs are 
funded privately, higher spending ceases to be 
a major concern. In other words, the perceived 
difficulties of funding programs for older work-
ers come not from the market, but from gov-
ernment intervention. Fortunately, reforms can 
solve that.
CONCLUSION
Labor freedom is in turmoil throughout 
Europe as the nations of the EU are forced to 
confront inefficiencies in their protectionist 
policies. In all relevant respects, the labor mar-
ket is not fundamentally different from other 
markets. Just as it is in so many other areas of 
human endeavor, the free market is superior 
when it comes to labor. Numerous theories and 
empirical studies confirm the counterproduc-
tive results of government intervention and the 
successes of deregulation.
In Western Europe, reality shows that there 
is a great need for liberalization in the labor 
market to allow more new jobs and prosper-
ity to develop. Viewed within the context of 
globalization and demographics, the need for 
reform is even stronger. It is also apparent that 
freedom in the labor market and better social 
conditions are not opposites. In fact, if the 
world wants to achieve both more jobs and bet-
ter living standards, freedom is essential.
